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Augustine's Invention of the inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist. By
Phillip Cary. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xviii + 214. $45
(cloth).
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, University of Illinois at Chicago
This book is an essay in intellectual history, an enterprise that its author
understands, largely following Alasdair MacIntyre, as an attempt to trace
the trajectory of a tradition through time. Such trajectories, Cary thinks, are
produced by the handing on of intellectual materials (texts, concepts,
modes of argument, epistemological and ontological commitments) from
one generation to the next, and by the attempt of those whose thought
moves within the bounds of some tradition or other to deal with the problems raised by that tradition for itself, and those produced for it by its
interaction with what is alien to it.
Cary deals in this book with a particular episode in the history of the
tradition of Christian thought, so understood. It is, as he presents it, a dramatic episode, one in which the inner self is for the first time explicitly presented as a space in which explorations can be undertaken and discoveries
made, a space the exploration of which is essential for the closer and fuller
understanding of God. This is what Cary calls the "invention" of the inner
self. In so calling it he plays upon the range of meanings to be found in the
Latin invenire: finding, discovery, creation, construction. The poet 'invents'
his tropes and images; the rhetor preparing a speech 'invents' his periods
and 'discovers' his authorities; and the philosopher faced with a difficulty
'finds' his concepts and 'constructs' his arguments-all this is suggested by
inverT ire, and by using the term Cary does not mean to suggest that the
'invention' of the idea that the self is timer space should be understood in
such a way as to deny that the self's inner space was also discovered
(found) by Augustine. Cary does in fact thti1k that Augustine's invention
was an unfortunate one from a Christian point of view; but his goal in the
book is neither to defend nor to explain any such view, but rather to show
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how Christians (at least in the Latin-using West) came to think it obvious
that there is indeed an inner self, and to think their thoughts about what
we are in terms of such an idea.
The episode investigated by Cary, in some considerable detail, is the
development of Augustine's thought from the time of his conversion to the
writing of the Cmifessions-which is to say, roughly the last fifteen years of
the fourth century. There are occasional references forward to the mature
Augustine's thought, but the focus of Cary's interest does not lie there: he
wants to show just how and just why Augustine came to think that the self
is an inner space, and that development took place, he thinks, between the
writing of the early dialogues at Cassiciacum in 386-387, and the composition of the Confessions in 397-400. The story he tells (and it is told with the
verve and excitement of the sleuth on the trail of a criminal) is of an
Augustine puzzled by how to understand the nature of the self and its
relation to God, and of his several attempts to bring together the tools for
thought given him by Platonism (more specifically by Plotinus) with his
specifically Christian (and increasingly biblical) commitments in order to
provide an answer to that question.
Cary begins by sketching the movement of Plato's thought from the
early aporetic dialogues to the later analysis of the conditions of the possibility of Socratic conceptual questioning. The Platonic move of importance
here, he suggests, is the mature Plato's understanding of the soul as eternally capable of entering into the vision of the intelligible forms, a vision
that is changelessly beautiful. This understanding of the soul is taken up
(mediated in part through Aristotle's claim that the soul is what it contemplates, and therefore is divine) and developed by Plotinus, who relates it to
a view of the cosmos as divided into concentric spheres. At the center is the
eternal point, the divine one, changeless, undifferentiated, unextended.
Circling around this is the sphere of the forms, also eternal but internally
differentiable (at least conceptually), and eternally contemplated by the
divine mind. Then comes the sphere of embodied souls, capable of looking
inward to the forms and to the one, and as a result capable also of becoming like them; but capable also of looking outward to the multiplicity of
particular material things, and as a result of becoming like them, changeable, divided, temporal, and subject to death. It was this view, according to
Cary, that Augustine had to learn and meditate upon in order to be able to
given a Christian account of the nature of the soul and its relation to God.
The Plotinian picture, in Cary's view, is the one before Augustine as he
composed the Confessions more than a decade after his conversion. For
Cary it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Confessions (together with
most of Augustine's work preceding it) is an extended Christian gloss on
Plotinus. This view is not held by all scholars of Augustine. It remains
unclear whether Augustine read Plotinus at all (though he probably did),
and still more unclear just what of Plotinus he read. It's notable that Cary's
emphasis upon the particular importance of Plotinus to Augustine requires
him rest a good deal upon a textually dubious reference to the libri Plotini
('books of Plotinus') in Augustine'S early treatise De Beata Vita, where he
mentions the books that were of importance to him in the summer of 386
as he prepared for his baptism. But the vast majority of manuscripts of this
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work read not libri Jllotini but libri Platol1is ('books of the Platonists'), as
Cary acknowledges; and while Cary's reading is certainly possible, it isn't
as obviously correct as he makes it seem. I mention this only to indicate by
example that Cary's emphasis upon Augustine's knowledge of the particulars of Plotinus' system is overdone; 1 don't mean thereby to call into question the basic thesis. It is entirely clear that Augustine's conceptual armory
is broadly Platonist and to some extent Plotinian. But it would be exegetically possible (and desirable) to alter the emphasis in Cary's account by
giving more importance than he does to Augustine's attention to biblical
exegesis during the period under investigation, perhaps even to the extent
of making it the main engine of Augustine's thought. Close reading of (for
example) Confessions 1.18.28 might provide a useful case study: here
Augustine weaves together echoes of Plotinus (perhaps provided him
from Porphyry or from some other digest of Plotinian ideas) with the parable of the Prodigal Son. Is what he says to be understood as a Plotinian
reading of Luke, or as a biblical reading of Middle Platonism? A decision
for the latter would alter a good deal in the emphasis of Cary's account,
but it would leave standing his main point, which is that Augustine'S
understanding of the soul can't be explained without looking at its broadly
Platonist underpinnings and commitments.
Augustine, then, comes to think of the soul as capable of knowing God
by looking inward. This, says Cary, makes God fwldamentally or essentially intelligible (as were the forms for Plato), and this view separates
Augustine from most Jews and many Christians before and after him, who
were not prepared to attribute essential intelligibility to God. Above all, the
view separates Augustine from Aquinas on the question of nature and
grace: for if the soul is naturally such that it can see, know, and understand
God (which is, on Cary's reading, Augustine's view, at least at the end of
the fourth century), then special grace is not needed for this, and a distinction fundamental to much Catholic and some Protestant thought falls
away. The view also calls into question what Cary calls the necessity of
Christ's flesh, whether in the incarnation or the eucharist. For if God can in
essentials be known by the introspective soul, and if knowing God is what
constitutes the proper end of the soul, then the flesh of Christ can have
only contingent relevance for the salvation of humans. This, in Cary's
view, is a dubiously orthodox position, and he rightly mentions its importance for Catholic controversies of the past century about 'ontologism' (are
we naturally-ontologically-such that we can see and know God?), and
about the importance of the (perhaps quasi-Jansenist) views of the naturegrace distinction associated by some with the advocates of 'la nouvelle theologie' in France around the middle of the twentieth century.
The central question here is: how should the soul's relation to God be
understood by Christians? Augustine is driven, on Cary's account, by a
deeply Plotinian need to affirm the soul's kinship to God by way of its
immortality and its capacity to see and know God's essence, on the one
hand; and by his need to affirm that sin provides a barrier to our understanding of and intimacy with God, and to provide an analysis of the nature
of that barrier, on the other. The second need was not finally met until
Augustine was forced to it by the Pelagians, in a series of works composed
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more than twenty years after those treated by Cary in this book. What
Augustine came to see by the end of the fourth century, according to Cary, is
that in spite of the imago Dei, the deep kinship of the soul to God, God must
always be praeter an imam, other than and beyond the soul. God can be
looked for in the inner space of the soul, a space which is in some sense infinite (the exploration of memory reveals no end to its capacities) and in some
sense everlasting (it will have no end in time), but which is not identical to
God. This picture of the soul, given in its most gorgeous literary form in the
tenth book of the Confessions, is what Cary means by Augustine's invention
of the inner self. The doctrine of sin is still not fully developed, but
Augustine has moved sufficiently far from (for example) the Soliloquies of
387, that he no longer makes the soul and God necessarily co-existent. The
inner self is a place in which God's traces may be found, an extended
metaphor for God; but it is no longer a place identical in essence with God,
nor a place inseparable from God.
This book is not the work of a philosopher with precise and analytical
tastes. Its principal value does not lie in the drawing of careful distinctions or
the offering of coercive and complex arguments. It is nonetheless a valuable
and important book, both for those interested in Augustine's thought, and
for those wanting, as Augustine wanted, to think Christian thoughts about
matters of philosophical interest. For the former, Cary's analysis of
Augustine's Plotinianism will no doubt provide fertile grOlmd for future discussion. For the latter, his richly textured depiction of how a particular
Christian at a particular time-Augustine at the end of the fourth centuryactually thought, has some important lessons to teach. Augustine wanted to
think as a Christian, to think Christian thoughts about the materials (biblical,
creedal, liturgical, conceptual) provided him by the church, handed down to
him by the tradition. But he found that the tradition did not provide him
with everything he needed in order to think Christian thoughts about tl1e
nature of the soul, and so he was pressed by his conversion to study
Platonism more deeply than before precisely in order to find what he needed. This is a portrayal of the intellectual situation of every Christian thinker;
it ought to be immediately recognizable and nourishing to readers of this
journal, and it may also serve as a corrective to those who want to think
Christian thoughts but who take themselves to have no need of the gold of
the Egyptians (Exodus 3:21-22, 12:35-36) in order to do so.

Warranted Christian Belief, by Alvin Plantinga, Oxford University Press,
Oxford and New York, 2000 ISBN 0-190513192-4 - 0-19-513193-2(pbk)
pp. xx + 508. $60.00 (hardcover), $24.95 (paperback).
ROGER TRIGG, University of Warwick
This is the eagerly awaited sequel to Plantinga's tvvo earlier books on epistemology, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function.
This one is, however, about the rational acceptability of Christian belief,
and is rooted firmly in Christian tradition, following such apparently dis-

